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ABSTRACT
One of the most puzzling aspects of the post—1973 floating exchange
rate system has been the apparently inefficient predictive performance
of forward exchange rates. This paper explores some aspects of each of
three leading explanations of forward—rate behavior. The paper first
develops a simple rational—expectations model of the "peso problem" that
generates some key empirical regularities of the foreign exchange
markets seemingly predictable and conditionally heteroskedastic forward
forecast errors, along with possible directional misprediction by the
forward premium. The implications of bubbles for tests of forward—rate
predictive efficiency are discussed next. It is argued that the exist-
ence of bubbles is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to establish
empirically. Even though some types of bubble could distort standard
tests on the relation between spot and forward exchange rates, it seems
unlikely that these bubbles have been an important factor. Finally, the
paper examines foreign—exchange asset pricing under risk aversion and
suggests that a convincing account of forward—rate behavior should also
help explain the results found in testing other asset—pricing theories,




Philadelphia, PA 19104—6297One of the most puzzling aspects of the post—1973 floating exchange
rate system has been the apparently inefficient predictive performance
of forward exchange rates. Richard tleese's survey of research on inter-
national asset pricing ably documents both the evidence on forward rate
determination and the attempts of researchers to pin down the empirical
relationship between forward and spot exchange rates.
Table 1, which reproduces in part results I reported in a 1985
paper, is representative of the empirical record. Shown in the table are
regressions linking the one-month percentage change in the spot dollar
price of a foreign currency to the corresponding one—month nominal
interest rate differential (or forward premium) from the previous month.
(The sample period is February 1975—January 1985.) For the four foreign
currencies tested, the forward premium tended on average to mispredict
the direction in which the dollar exchange rate moved during the sub-
sequent month. Forward premiums have therefore been badly biased predic-
tors of subsequent exchange—rate movements. As Meese notes, a further
indication of the poor forecasting performance of forward rates is the
large body of evidence pointing to the ex ante predictability of forward
forecast error; by past Information.
Three broad approaches to explaining the preceding facts can be
The table also shows that forward premiums have virtually no predic-
tive value with respect to future depreciation. This fact is not
necessarily evidence of some market failure; it is consistent with a
world in which exchange rate movements are dominated by rational
market reactions to unpredictable events. It is noteworthy that the
early regressions of spot exchange rate levels on lagged forward
rate levels seemed to indicate a greater predictive value of the
forward rate than is evident in Table 1. Meese; argument that the
forward— and spot—rate processes are cointegrated suggests that the
latter findings are the spurious result of a common stochastic
trend.Table 1: One—Month Eurocurrency Interest—Rate Differentials and Subsequent
Dollar Depreciation, February 1975—January 1985
Depreciation rate Lagged Eurocurrency —2
of dollar against: Constant interest differential D.—W. R
Yen 0.113 —2.188 1.97 0.03
(0.056) (0.985)
French Franc —0.092 —0.483 2.27 —0.01
(0.039) (0.773)
Deutschemark 0.040 —1.778 2.23 0.00
(0.071) (1.573)
Pound Sterling —0.102 —1.477 1.93 0.02
(0.037) (0.875)
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage change in the dollar price of
the foreign currency, expressed on an annualized basis. The independent
variables are a constant and the difference between the previous months
one—month Eurodollar deposit rate and one—month foreign Eurocurrency deposit
rate. Exchange rate data are end—of—month data from OECD Main Economic
Indicators. End—of—month interest rates come from Morgan Suaranty Trust
Company of New York, World_Financial Markets. Standard errors are given
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.—2—
discerned in Meese's review. The first of these approaches holds that
the empirical findings may result from distributional peculiarities such
astheItpeso problem or from other factors that cause nonstationarities
in the data. The second approach posits an important role for specula-
tive bubbles and/or market irrationality in exchange—rate determination.
The third approach observes that private risk aversion can imply time—
varying discrepancies between forward premiums and expected future spot
depreciation. Risk aversion thus offers another potential explanation of
measured deviations from uncovered interest parity.
Economists have not reached a consensus interpretation of the data.
Yet, the answer may have important implications for policymakers. A
determination that the foreign—exchange market is driven by irrational
trading, for example, would stengthen both the case for fixed exchange
rates and the case for direct controls on international capital move-
ments.
Below I explore some aspects of each of the three leading explana-
tions of forward—rate behavior. Section I develops a simple rational—
expectations model of the peso problem that generates some key empirical
regularities of the foreign exchange market: seemingly predictable and
conditionally heteroskedastic forward forecast errors, along with pos-
sible directional misprediction by the forward premium. Section II
discusses the implications of bubbles for tests of forward—rate predic-
tive efficiency. Section III expands on Meeses discussion of foreign—
exchange asset pricing under risk aversion. I suggest there that a
convincing account of forward—rate behavior should also help explain the
results found in testing other asset—pricing theories, such as the
expectations theory of the interest—rate term structure.—3—
I. Peso Problems
A peso problem arises when market forecasts reflect the possibility
of major events that occur relatively infrequently in the data set
available to the econometrician. Even though market expectations may be
entirely reasonable cx ante, market forecasts appear biased and forecast
errors appear serially correlated in the cx post sample. To the best of
my knowledge, the effects of the peso problem on efficiency tests were
first noticed by Kennth Rogoff in connection with the behavior of
Mexican peso futures prior to the August 1976 devaluation of that cur-
rency. (An elegant formal model of the episode has been developed by
os(Sal Lizondo.) Stephen Salant and Dale Henderson presented the
first theoretical analysis of a peso—type problem in studying the be-
havior of gold prices under the threat of official gold—market interven-
tion.
The peso problem is essentially one of small—sample inference. An
announcement by the United States Treasury Secretary that the dollar is
°too strong may lead the market to repeatedly underestimate the
dollar's future strength if monetary policies are not promptly adjusted
to push the dollar down. Market expectations will be reassessed if it
becomes clear that official pronouncements are not being backed by
concrete policy shifts. But an econometrician looking at a limited data
set would erroneously interpret hypothesis tests based on asymptotic
distribution theory as rejections of market inefficiency. Reliable
inference would require a data set covering many similar episodes,
including some in which official pronouncements did lead to the implied
policy actions.
An example of a floating—rate peso problem shows how some aspects—4—
of the seemingly anomalous behavior of exchange rates can be modelled
without appeal to irrationality or risk aversion. Such a model requires
the description of a general—equilibrium framework within which exchange
rates are determined. To make my main points as simply as possible, I
adopt the monetary approach to exchange—rate determination, as described
by Michael Mussa. Karen Lewis has used this model to construct a com-
plementary example in which a peso problem arises because agents are
uncertain about the monetary regime currently in effect.
The monetary approach is based on an exchange rate equation of the
form
(1) s(t) E(s(t+1) —s(t)3}+
whereeCt) is the natural logarithm of S(t), the domestic—currency price
of foreign exchange, is a constant that measures the spot rate's
response to expected future depreciation, Et(.) is a rational expecta-
tion conditional on time—t information, m is a coefficient vector, and
4(t) is a vector of exogenous variables. The equation is derived from an
uncovered interest—rate parity condition together with a theory of
nominal interest rates and price levels in which the key variables are
s(t) and 4(t). The vector 4(t) could in principle include an
exogenously—varying risk premium, but such an exogeneity assumption is
implausible. The model embodied in (1) is therefore best viewed as
describing a hypothetical world economy with risk—neutral investors.
The Hbubble_freeh solution to (I) j
(2) s(t) =tl/(1+))E
i=o
Thissolution is found by iterating (1) forward and imposing a-5.-
stationarity condition that is described in detail in the next section.
For my example, it is sufficient to assume that 4(t) consists of a
single variable (the log of the money supply) and that m 1.
To model a peso problem, assume that on any date t, the log money
supply is the sum of two random variables. The first is a random—walk
process, m(t) ,thesum of m(t—1) and a completely unpredictable mean—
zero disturbance, (t). The second random variable contributing to the
money—supply process is itself the product of two random variables,
denoted d(t) and (t). d(t) has the distribution:
(1 (with probability it)
d(t)= conditionalon d(t—1) 0;
0 (with probability 1 —ii)
d(t)= 1(with probability 1) conditional on d(t—1) 1.
Conditional on d(t—1) =0,(t) is generated by the first—order
autoregressive process p(t) =pM(t—l)+ Ct), where 0 ￿p< I and
Et1CE(t)) =0;but p(t+j) (j > 0) is constant at p(t) conditional on
d(t) =1. 4(t) thereforefollows the process
(3) 4(t) =m(t) + d(t)p(t) = m(t—1)+(t)+d(t)fi(t).
Theinterpretationof equation (3) is this. One component of the
money supply process is a random walk, which in itself would lead to no
expected future change in money. It is the second component, the product
d(t)p(t), which causes a peso problem. Each period, there is a probabil-
ity itthatthe money supply will jump permanently by the amount p(t),
given that no such jump has yet taken place. The expected value of this
possible jump is pp(t—I) in the previous period. The z(t) process is-6-
assumed to damp out monotonically in mean to capture the intuitive
notion that the market expects to put progressively less weight on the
significance of a possible policy change the longer the interval over
which the change has not occurred.2
The simple exchange—rate model set out above can now be used to
analyze the difficulties associated with peso problems. For this pur-
pose, it is assumed that d(t) 0 for all observations t available to
the econometrician. In other words1 even though the market viewed a
major policy switch as a possibility, the available data are conditioned
on the non—occurrence of that event. The peso problem modelled here has
three major implications:
1. pparent conditional bias in market exchange—rate forecasts,
Assume for simplicity that the econometrician can directly observe the
markets expectation, Ets(t+l), of next periods exchange rate, but not
the true, cx ante money—supply process itself. In forecasting the ex-
change rate, the market took into account the possibility that d might
equal I on some future date, even though the event d1 turned out not
to occur cx post. The possibility that d might equal 1 is reflected in
the sequence of expected future money supplies,Et$Ct+i), i ) 0.
That sequence is computed as follows. If d(t) =0,the event d
will have dccurred by date t+i with probability (1 —(l—ii)] i + w(l—
i) + u(I—ir)2 + ...+t(I —I)11.On date t, the expected value of
f(t+i) is therefore the sum of m(t) and ( + ir(1—w)p + it(1—ir)p)2+
+ 1r[(1_w)p)11}pp(t), where the latter term is just the expected date—
(t+i) value of the second component of the money—supply process. Thus,
conditional on d(t) 0,
2
Alternatively, one could assume a time—varying IT to capture this
type of effect.—7—
1 —E(i—iiip)1
E$(t+i)mR) + — irpp(t)
I — (I—nip
forall i > 0.
Combined with equation (2) (for the case u1), the above formula
implies
(5) s(t) m(t) + pit).
(1 + —(1—ir)p)










given that d(t+1) =0.
Note that the forecast error conditional on d(t+1) 0 depends on
the lagged variable pit). If pit) > 0 over some interval, for example,
the market appears systematically to overestimate the home currencys
future depreciation. This pattern of ex post forecast errors does not
imply a conditionally biased forecast: the market also took into account
the likelihood of the event d(t+1) 1, which would have occasioned a
sharp increase in the money supply.
More formally, if d(t+l) I had occurred, the equilibrium exchange
rate, sCt+1) m(t+1) +p(t+l),wouldhave resulted in a forecast error-B-
+ (1—p)p](1—iiip(t)
(B> s(t+1) — Et(s(t+l)] t(t+1)+ —.
(1+ —(l—1T)p]




E{ø(t+1) + = 0.
£1 * —(l—i!)p)
Expectations are therefore conditionally unbiased.
An econometricia,, viewing a sample conditioned on d(t)0 would
fail to reach this last conclusion using standard methods of inference.
If the forecast error (7) is regressed on the lagged depreciation
forecast, for example, a negative regression coefficient will be found
with high probability (as implied by results in the next paragraph). But
such a finding is not evidence of an inefficient market in the present
context. The resulting regression equation provides an estimate of
Et(error(t+1)Id(t*1)=0), which is generally nonzero. Since
Etterror(t*1)]0, however, forecast errors are indeed uncorrelated
with past information given the true distribution of the money supply
(and hence of forecast errors).
2. Exchangrate misprediction. This particular model implies also
that rational market forecasts will on average mispredict the exchange
rate's direction of change as long as d =1does not occur. By (5) and






If p(t) > 0, for example, the market expects the currency to depreciate,
and the home interest rate consequently exceeds the foreign rate under





If t(t+1) =0,the currency ppreciates (still assuming p(t) >
0) as the market revises downward by the factor 1—p the expected future
path of the money supply's second component. In a sample where d(t)0
for all t, realized and expected depreciation will therefore be nega-
tively correlated, even though interest parity holds and expectations
are rational. (Table 1 showed that recent data are characterized by a
negative correlation between forward premiums and subsequent deprecia-
tion rates.)
3. Conditional heteroskedasticity of forecasterrors. Peso problems
can result in time—dependence in the conditional covariances of forecast
errors. Robert Cumby and I first presented evidence of such conditional
heteroskedasticity in forward—rate forecast errors, and our finding has
been confirmed by Robert Hodrick and Sanjay Srivastava, Alberto Giavan—
nini and Philippe Jorion, and many others. As Meese notes, conditional
heteroskedasticity may pose problems for statistical inference. In a
world of risk—averse investors, the phenomenon also has a crucial im-
plication about the nature of foreign—exchange risk premiums, as
detailed below in section III,
Assume that the random variables (t) and c Ct) themselves have—10-
constant conditional variances, so that Et((t+1)2) r and Etc(t+1)2]
=r.In spite of these assumptions, the conditional variance of the
exchange—rate forecast error depends on lagged information in the
preceding model. If d =1has occurred, then the exchange—rate forecast
2 2 error is just e(t). Thus, Et(error(t+l) 3r, where the conditioning
set contains d(t). If d1 has not occurred, however, the conditional
variance of the forecast error is different. Assume p0 for
simplicity. Under that assumption, the population conditional variance
of the forecast error, E error(t+1)23, is n(r2 + 2 + + (1—i) Cr2) t
2 2
r + T(2r0 + re), where the conditioning set again contains d(t).
An econometrician may well find evidence of conditional heteros—
kedasticity in a sample conditioned on d(t) =0.For example, regres-
sions of the squared forecast error (7) on variables including the
squared forward premium, 2p2p(t)2/C1 + —(1—ir)p32,are likely to be
significant. Cumby and I used this type of regression specification to
test for conditional heteroskedasticity.
Other statistical difficulties may distort standard efficiency
tests even when peso problems are absent. One of these, discussed exten-
sively by fleese, is the unit—root problem, which invalidates much of the
asymptotic distribution theory on which many of the tests in the litera-
ture depend. Another instance of nonstatianarity, also mentioned by
Pleese, is probably very important in practice. ecause the processes
generating exchange—market data are subject to structural change, there
is no guarantee that the unconditional covariances of the relevant
economic variables remain constant through time. The possibility of such
structural changes has implications for econometric attempts to identify
another anomalous exchange—rate phenomenon, the speculative bubble.—1 1—•
II. Speculative Bubbles
Speculative bubbles can be modelled within the monetary model of
the previous section. Equation (2), which gives the equilibrium exchange
rate just analyzed, is only one possible solution to the stochastic
difference equation (1). A general solution takes the form
(9) s(t) =E1/(1+7)]E t7/(i+7)31Et(u'$(t+i)) +
i=O
where (x(t)) is any stochastic process with the martingale property,
Et(x(t+1)] =x(t).
Solution (2) corresponds to the choice x(t) =0,for all t, but because
x(t) is multiplied in (9) by the exploding term ((j\)/73t, choice of a
nonzero x—process will impart explosive behavior to the exchange rate.
Such explosive paths capture the idea of speculative bubbles driven by
self—fulfilling anticipations.
It is sometimes asserted that bubbles give rise to serially—
correlated market forecast errors or to biased forecasts, but this is
not the case when the bubbles path is described by an equation like
(9). Define vt+1(t+l) Et+iCu'$(t+i)) —Erm'$(t+i))
and r)(t+l) =
x(t+1)—
EEx(t+1)]x(t+1). When expectations are rational and the




This error is, however, uncorrelated with time—t information (including—12—
lagged forecast errors), and the market forecast is therefore condition-
ally unbiased.
While market forecasts remain efficient, the presence of bubbles
will generally Invalidate the usual efficiency tests. Consider, for
example, a test for bias in exchange—rate forecasts. Assume, for
simplicity, that u'$(t) itself follows a martingale process, sothatits
conditional expectation equals its own lagged value. Then
(10) sCt+1) —Et(s(t+1))
=v(t+l)+
Asignificance test for the sample mean
T
MCT) =(lIT) £ Cs(t+1)—
Et[s(t+1)3) t=1
is a test for unconditional bias in exchange—rate forecasts. But the
variance of MCI) can be calculated as
VartM(T)] (lIT2) +
V 7
whenvand1 are stationary and uncorrelated. This variance does not go
to zero as 1 -e .Itfollows that the statistic M(T) will not neces-
sarily give a consistent estimate of the mean forecast error in the
presence of a bubble. Even though agents are making optimal forecasts,
the ususal tests might give strong indications of inefficiency.
As Meese notes, however, bubbles are an unlikely explanation of
the puzzle of forward exchange rate behavior. Under the type of bubble
described by (9), the variance of one—step—ahead forecast errorsex-
plodes over time at rate ((j))/]2, as (10) shows. Taking the logarithm
of the forward rate as an approximation to the expected logarithm of the—13—
future spot rate gives a rough empirical measure of this forecast error
under risk neutrality. The stylized facts recounted by Meese imply that
the variance of forward forecast errors does not explode over time. Nor
is such behavior observed over subperiods. In particular, a bubble as in
(9) would be inconsistent with the approximate random walk followed by
spot and forward rates.3
There are two other reasons for dismissing divergent speculative
bubbles as a characterization of exchange—rate behavior. First, there is
a strong theoretical case for ruling them out (as discussed in my paper
with Rogoff). Second, as first pointed out by Robert Flood and Peter
Garber, bubbles are observationally equivalent to possible changes in
the 4(t) process that the public may expect with good reason.
The observational equivalence of bubbles and anticipated future
changes is illustrated by an example related to the one analyzed in the
previous section.4 Suppose again that m is a scalar equal to I and that
4(t) is the money supply. Until a known date T in the future, 4(t) is
expected to equal the random variable m(t) with probability 1, where
m(t) =m(t—1)+ 0(t), as before. There is a possibility, however, that
the 4(t) process will change permanently on date T. Specifically, the
public knows that the money supply for Y ￿Iwill be given by the
random variable $(t') =m(t')+ pCI), where p(t) =Cl—d(t)](p(t—1)+
c(t)] (for t ￿ T) and d(t) and E(t) are as defined earlier. In words,
There are some models in which the bubble term involves the power of
a root that is smaller than unity In absolute value. These conver-
gent bubbles are difficult to rule out by inspecting the data, but
on the other hand they do not necessarily destroy the validity of
the standard efficiency tests. It is therefore unlikely that conver-
gent bubbles are responsible for the apparent failure of risk—
neutral foreign exchange pricing.
A similar example illustrating this equivalence is give by James
Hamilton.—14—
the public expects a sharp jump in themoney supply at time T if the
event d(t) =1does not occur in the interim. The expected size of the
possible jump, p(t), evolve; as a random walk.
Consider next the Nbubble_freeht exchange—rate solution(2), which
is now equal to
s(t)m(t) + E (7/(1+)31p(t).
i=T-t
Rewrite this equation as
s(t) =m(t)+
(where K = ((1_)/(1)]T);since Etp(t+l/(1_1)t4l] =
(l_lr)p(t)/(l_w)t+l=p(t)/(1_lr)t(conditional on d(t) =0),the result
is a special case of (9), corresponding to
Et('$(t+i))m(t) for all
I. The equation therefore show; that an econometricianwho is unaware
that the public expected a possible change in themoney—supply process
will be unable to distinguish the exchange rate'; bubble—freepath from
that of a crashing' bubble such as the oneanalyzed by Olivier
Blanchard. The strong theoretical case againstdivergent bubbles sug-
gests that econometric result; purporting to show their existenceare
more likely to be the result of misspecifying agents' informationsets.
It is noteworthy that the example just given and(by implication)
some bubbles may lead to peso problems. This coincidence doesnot imply
that peso problems and bubbles are the same. The model ofthe last
section, for example, ;hows that peso problems need not give rise to
explosive exchange—rate behavior.
The bubble model embodied in equation (9)assumes rational one—
step—ahead forecasting by market participants, but itimposes no ter——15—
minal convergence condition to tie the exchange rate to economic fun-
damentals. As Meese notes, some researchers have suggested that market
forecasts are not rational, and that exchange rates may be prone to
Iloverreactionil or excessive' volatility. Under risk neutrality, the
recently—developed volatility tests applied to stock and bond markets
offer a "portmanteau" methodology that potentially detects bubbles as
well as other deviations from efficient asset pricing based on fundamen-
tals. How one should interpret these tests in practice is currently a
matter of some controversy. (Joe Mattey and Meese provide a survey of
the econometric issues in the debate, together with the results of Monte
Carlo experiments.) In paticular, volatility tests, like tests for
bubbles, require strong identifying assumptions about market expecta—
U on;.
Even 14 one accepts the methodology of volatility testing in prin-
ciple, it is not clear how it can be applied to the foreign exchange
market. Economists have developed widely accepted theories of both stock
pricing and the term structure of interest rates under risk neutrality
and rational expectations; it is these theories upon which the
volatility tests build, No correspondingly clear—cut theory of risk—
neutral nominal or real exchange—rate determination exists. A consensus
theory of exchange rates would require agreement on the determinants of
relative demands for fiat monies, a; well as on the dividing line be-
tween money and near—money. Such a theory would also require a consensus
model of demand and supply in national output markets.
III. Risk
Risk aversion on the part of market participants provides a third—16-
potential explanation of apparent deviations from uncovered interest
parity. Although much of the empirical literature on the risk premium
reports negative results, more recent research lends limited support to
the empirical relevance of risk—averse asset pricing.
To see how risk aversion gives rise to departures from interest
parity, consider the relation between the nominal interest rates on one—
period bonds denominated in home and foreign currency. An international
investor following an optimal consumption/investment plan must be indif-
ferent among the three alternatives of using an additional domestic—
currency unit to augment his domestic—currency assets, allocating the
money to foreign—currency assets, or spending the money on consumption
goods today. Indifference occurs when each course of action yields the
same expected marginal return. Let the investors period utility func-
tion be u(C(t)3, let p < I denote the subjective time—preference factor,
let R (Re) denote the domestic (foreign) one—period nominal interest
rate, and let P (Pc) be the local money price of the typical home (for-
eign) consumption bundle. For a domestic investor, the optimality condi-
tion described above is
u'CC(t>l u'C(t+1)3 u'(C(t+l)]S(t+l)
}
P(1+R*(t))Et( Nt) P(t+1) P(t+1)S(t)
where S(t), as before, is the level (rather than the log) of the ex-
change rate. Define Q(t+1) to be the cx post marginal rate of substitu-
tion between domestic currency units available on dates t and t+l; thus,
QCt+1) ={pu'(C(t+l))/P(t+l)}+(u'[C(t)/p(t)}.The equation above can be




(12) (i+R(t))/[1+R*(t) 3 =EtEQ(t+1)S(t+1)/s(t))/EtEQ(t+1) 3.
Because the one—period forward exchange rate F(t) is equated by covered
interest parity to S(t)E1+R(t))/U+R*(t), equations (11) and (12) above
lead to Meeses equation (2) for the forward rate.
While (11) and (12) were derived by considering the alternatives
available to a typical domestic investor, consideration of a foreign
investor would lead to the same expressions. As noted earlier,
EtEQ(t+1)] is an expected marginal rate of substitution between present
and future home—currency units. Et[Q(t+1)S(t+1)/S(t)3 can likewise be
interpreted as an expected marginal rate of substitution between present
and future units of the foreign currency. In the equilibrium of an
internationally integrated asset market, all investors should have the
same expected intertemporal substitution rate for each currency they
trade. Both the numerator and the denominator on the right—hand side of
(12) are therefore independent, in equilibrium, of the particular inves-
tor considered, provided all investors have access to the same bond
markets.5
Theimplicationsof (12) for uncovered interest parity are under-




Equation (13) shows the deviation from uncovered interest parity that
In my 1987 paper I test the international equality ofintertemporal
marginal substitution rates between the U.S. and Germany and between
the U.S. and Japan. For post—1972 data, the tests I conduct fail to
reject those equalities.-18—
arises in the present model the right—hand side of the equation is
usually referred to as the (one—period) foreign exchange risk premium on
domestic currency. The risk premium is positive if the homecurrencys
depreciation against foreign currency is unexpectedly high at times when
the increase in the marginal utility from spending a domesticcurrency
unit is also unexpectedly high. In other words, the homecurrency is
riskier if It tends to lose foreign—exchange value in states of the
world where it is most needed. A positive risk premium implies that the
domestic—foreign interest ratio exceeds the expected depreciation of
home currency, while a negative risk premium implies the opposite.
The right—hand side of equation (13) equals the one—period forward
premium, F(t)/S(t), less expected depreciation. Thus, the equation also
reveals that the forward—premium forecast error, tS(t+1) —F(t)]IS(t),
consists of a true, random forecast error less a risk premium that
generally varies over time. Since the risk premium is a function of
time—t information, forward—premium forecast errors are also predictable
on the basis of that information. Many researchers therefore ascribe the
apparent partial predictability of forward—premium errors to time—
varying risk premiums. This explanation is sensible only if risk
premiums are sufficiently variable that their influence is not dominated
by that of the pure expectational errors.
If the relevant economic variables arejointlylognormally dis-
tributed (because their logs are generated by a linear Gaussian
process), then (12) becomes
(14) r(t) —r*(t)—EtEs(t+l)]VartAs(t+1)3/2 +Cov(q(t+1),As(t+1)),
where r(t) =logt1+R(t),r*(t) logCl+R*(t)3, and qit) log(Q(t)).
Lars Peter Hansen and Hodrick (1983) first derived thiswidely—tested—19—
logarithmic model within a utility—maximizing framework. A major im-
plication of this model is that the conditional variance and covariance
on the right—hand side of (14) are both constant (given stationarity)
implying a constant risk premium. Constancy follows from the fact that
the innovations in q(t+1) and s(t+1), being normal, are independent of
time—t variables, not just uncorrelated with them. Since the risk
premium must vary over time to explain the predictability of forward
forecast errors by past information, the logarithmic model is clearly
inconsistent with the data. Another of the models implications, the
conditional homoskedasticity of forward—rate forecast errors, also
contradicts the facts. Conditional heteroskedasticity may be casued by
peso problems, as noted above, but there are obviously other possible
causes.
As Meese documents, alternative models of the risk premium also
seem to do poorly when confronted with the data. But I think it is too
early to conclude, as does Jeffrey Frankel, that risk—averse behavior
can explain only a negligible fraction of the observed serial correla-
tion in forward forecast errors. In recent work, Cumby (1986a) presents
direct estimates of foreign exchange risk premiums that provide some
support for the risk—averse asset—pricing model described by equation
(13).6 My own preliminary estimates (1987) ofa logarithmic,
consumption—based model of real interest—rate differentials are also
encouraging. The problems discussed in section I above are almost cer-
tainly important, however, and one goal of research should be to take
these data problems explicitly into account. The role of risk aversion
6
Cumbys (1986b) results on stock—market prices in Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States appear less supportive of
the model.—20—
cannot be assessed adequately until more refined procedures for purging
the data have been developed.
Another promising direction forfutureresearch istointegrate
studies of foreign exchange pricing with studies of price determination
in other asset markets. The (rational) expectations model of the term
structure, like uncovered interest—rate parity, has been widely tested
and rejected. As documented by Robert SMiler, John Campbell, and Kermit
Schoenholtz, the interest—rate forecasts Implicit in the term structure,
like forward foreign exchange premiums, often mispredict the direction
of future rate movements in post—1959 data. It is more than an appeal to
Occam's razor to suggest that a single theory should explain these
similar phenomena. In view of the increasingly tight links between
onshore and offshore asset markets, it is difficult to conceive of a
convincing account of the foreign—exchange risk premium that does not
simultaneously throw light on the characteristics of term premiums and
stock—market risk premiums,
Consider, for example, the tight connection between term premiums
and foreign—exchange premiums implied by covered interest parity. Let
(i) Ci) (i) F denote the i—period forward exchange rate and R (R* ) the i—
periodinterest rate on a domestic (foreign) bond. Covered interest
parity ensures that for any i,
F(1) Ct)/S(t) =t1+R(t) ]i/E1+R*(i) Ct)
To be concrete, apply the above expression to compute the ratio of the




Let 7 (7*) denote the domestic (foreign) one—period term premium
and let (i =1,2)denote the i—period foreign—exchange risk
premium. Reasoning similar to that followed above shows that
,(t)
Covt{Q(t+l)Q(t+2,C1+R (t+1)])/Et(Q(t+1)Q(t+2)].
The foreign term premium ,*(t) depends in the same way on the covariance
between the foreign one—period interest rate and the cx post marginal
rate of substitution between foreign currency units delivered on dates t
and t+2. Equation (15), expressed in terms of these risk premiums,can
be shown to be
EtS(t+2)/S(t)] + 82(t) E(l÷R1(t+1)) + 7(t)
EttSt+1)/S(t)) +eU)(t) Ett1+R*(t+1)] + T*(t)
Expressions such as this one imply restrictions on the joint behavior of
foreign—exchange risk premiums and bond—market term premiums.
Intriguing results have come out of research that examines several
asset markets at the same time. Richard Clarida and Campbell, forex-
ample, find that variables with explanatory power for term premiums also
help predict returns to forward foreign exchange speculation. Giovannini
and Jorion report similarities in the conditional distributions of
foreign—exchange and U.S. stock—market risk premiums. In time, further
investigation into findings such as these may help explain the puzzling
behavior of forward exchange rates.—22-
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